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Abstract
The regulation of the transfer of property mortis causa has been a major concern of 
social reformers since the Enlightenment. Today, by contrast, the issue of the bequest 
of wealth from generation to generation stirs hardly any political controversy. Since 
the mid-twentieth century the topic has lost much of its earlier significance in public 
debates. In this working paper I show that over the last forty years we can observe a 
backlash in key areas of inheritance law which breaks the Enlightenment’s promise to 
distribute wealth in society based on individual achievement rather than ascriptive cri-
teria. Hence the question: “Are we still modern?”
Zusammenfassung
Die Regulierung der Vermögensvererbung war wichtiger Gegenstand von Sozialrefor-
men seit der Aufklärung. Heute hingegen erregt der Umgang mit Erbschaften kaum 
noch politische Aufmerksamkeit. Seit der zweiten Hälfte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts 
hat das Thema seine Bedeutung im öffentlichen Diskurs verloren. Das Working Paper 
zeigt einen Backlash in zentralen Bereichen des Erbrechts während der letzten vierzig 
Jahre auf, durch den mit dem Versprechen der Aufklärung gebrochen wird, Reichtum 
nicht nach Kriterien der Herkunft, sondern nach Maßstäben von Leistung zu verteilen. 
Daher die Frage: „Sind wir noch modern?“
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The regulation of the transfer of property mortis causa has been a major concern of 
social reformers for more than 200 years. Reform of the laws on inheritance became a 
pressing topic in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for thinkers and politicians 
such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Mirabeau, Thomas Jefferson, Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Blackstone, Hegel, Fichte, and John Stuart Mill. All of these thinkers agreed on the im-
portance of inheritance law for the transformation of the social and family order, based 
on principles of individuality, social justice, democracy, and equality before the law. In 
fact, reform of inheritance law was seen as a key instrument of social reform, undoing 
the feudal order of the past and realizing the bourgeois order. The centrality of inheri-
tance law reform is very aptly described by two quotes from Alexis de Tocqueville and 
John Stuart Mill. Tocqueville wrote that the question of inheritance was so important 
to a society’s development that when “the legislator has once regulated the law of in-
heritance, he may rest from his labor” ([1835]1980, Vol. 1: 48). And John Stuart Mill 
([1848]1976: 202–203) saw inheritance law as the most critical area of law, equaled in 
significance only by contract law and the status of workers. 
For social reformers, the bequest of property was often deeply problematic. It was as-
sociated with a system of inherited privileges characteristic of aristocratic societies and 
stood in conflict with fundamental bourgeois values of equality and meritocracy. These 
values are intimately linked to modernity. In his pattern variables, the American sociolo-
gist Talcott Parsons (1951) distinguished modern societies from traditional societies in 
terms of five pairs of categories that pattern social relationships and institutions. While 
social relationships in traditional societies are characterized by affectivity, collectivity 
orientation, particularism, diffuseness, and ascription, relationships in modern socie-
ties are, by contrast, characterized by affective-neutrality, self-orientation, universalism, 
specificity, and achievement. 
It is just one of these categorical juxtapositions that I will discuss: The distinction be-
tween ascription and achievement. Ascription means that social status is institutionally 
allocated based on characteristics ascribed to people by birth. Certain rights, obliga-
tions, roles, or privileges are conferred upon a person, based on the social position of 
his or her parents or based on gender, age, ethnicity, or nationality. Achievement, by 
contrast, means that the distribution of wealth and social status is based on the actual 
contribution or performance of the individual. 
From this perspective, the bequest of wealth from generation to generation is deeply 
problematic in the context of modernity (Beckert 1999). Inherited property comes to 
the heir “effortlessly,” through the death of another person. The institution of inheri-
tance thus runs counter to the justification of unequal distribution of wealth based on 
individual merit and achievement and perpetuates social privileges. It also violates the 
This text is based on a keynote lecture given at the opening of the workshop “Inherited Wealth, Jus-
tice and Equality” on March 4, 2010, at Antwerp University.
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principle of equality of opportunity, which asserts that the starting conditions should 
be as equal as possible for all, so that differences in wealth can reflect the actual accom-
plishments of individuals. How can the “unearned” acquisition of wealth be justified 
within the context of a social order that legitimizes social inequalities as the product of 
the different contributions its members make through personal achievement? 
But are our societies today really still concerned with the issue of the bequest of wealth 
from generation to generation? I will argue that the topic of inheritance concerned 
social reformers from the Age of Enlightenment onwards, up until the mid-twentieth 
century, when it all but disappeared from public debate. Today, it is a marginalized issue 
that pops up here and there without creating the social controversies it once did. This 
is not an interesting observation as such. It could be, one might suspect, that after 150 
years of reform the law has finally become “modern,” and social discourse can shift its 
attention to other subjects. However, as I will argue, this is not the whole story. Instead, 
what we can observe over the last forty years is a backlash in crucial areas of inheritance 
law which breaks the Enlightenment’s promise of moving from ascription to achieve-
ment. Hence the question: “Are we still modern?”
I will first describe three fields of reform of inheritance law which have been of crucial 
importance to liberal reformers since the late eighteenth century: changes in statutory 
law, the abolition of entail, and the introduction of progressive estate taxation. I will 
show how changes in these legal fields can be understood as the recognition of values of 
equality, meritocracy, and social justice. Following this, I will argue that at least in two 
of these areas the last forty years have seen a backlash which breaks in important ways 
with previous achievements. 
But is this really problematic? Do we still have to bother about debates passionately 
conducted two hundred years ago? Are the normative principles of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries still relevant today? In the last part I will discuss the question of 
what the diagnosed backlash means for society and what it means for the concept of 
modernity. 
1 Inheritance law and the family
Let me start with reforms of statutory inheritance law and their implications for family 
relations. 
Historical analysis reveals how crucial reforms of inheritance law were believed to be 
for political and social modernization (Beckert 2008). One of the aims of reforms in 
inheritance law in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was changing the 
structure of family relations. These changes to the family were seen, at the same time, as 
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part of reforms of the political order. This finds clear expression in reforms of inheri-
tance law in France during the Revolution. The reforms were aimed at altering family 
structures by establishing equality among the children, abolishing the father’s arbitrary 
license in making decisions relating to inheritance, and breaking the dynastic conti-
nuity of noble families. The change in family structures brought about by changes in 
inheritance law was also a means of creating the social conditions for new political 
structures. In France, family relationships based on greater equality were seen to be the 
foundations upon which the social structures of the new political community were to 
be erected. In a constantly recurring metaphor, the family was described as the “cell” of 
the nation, whose structure would have a decisive influence on the nature of the politi-
cal order. Family affairs were thus an “affaire d’État.” 
These normative and political convictions were reflected in several reform projects. The 
first was the abolition of primogeniture, a measure introduced in most European coun-
tries at about this time, with the remarkable exception of England, where it was not 
abolished until 1925. Primogeniture was an important part of intergenerational pres-
ervation of economic and political power in feudal societies. Its abolition was a means 
of breaking with this order. 
Other reform projects in statutory inheritance law referred to the equality of broth-
ers and sisters and the rights of the surviving spouse to parts of the property of the 
deceased. While children achieved equality before the law independent of their gender 
with the abolition of primogeniture, the strengthening of inheritance rights of the sur-
viving spouse was a long-lasting process that was completed only in the second part of 
the twentieth century. 
The issue here is largely one of gender equality. Property law favored men over women. 
This was most pronounced in common law. Common law stipulated that, upon mar-
riage, disposition over the wife’s property passed to the husband. The wife’s moveable 
property was transferred to the husband, which meant that he also passed it on by 
will. In the case of real property, while it remained formally in the wife’s possession, its 
economic benefit belonged to the husband. In short, the wife became a femme couverte. 
The legal background to this was the principle of marital unity in common law. The 
“executor” of this unity was the husband. “The husband and wife are one person in law,” 
according to William Blackstone’s famous dictum ([1771]2002, 1: 339). 
Reforms to strengthen the legal position of the surviving spouse started in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Over a period of 150 years one can observe a steady process 
of increasing equality between men and women in property law and in inheritance 
law. These trends demonstrate a growing assertion of the principle of equality. They 
also demonstrate the declining role of the dynastic bequest of wealth within the family 
blood line.
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Gender equality was not the only way in which reforms of inheritance law interfered 
in traditional family relations aiming at equality in the family. Especially in France, but 
also in Germany, the normative principle of equality was also supposed to be asserted 
through the limitation of testamentary freedom. At one point during the Revolution 
testamentary freedom was completely abolished and even today the stipulations of the 
Code Civil contain strong restrictions on testamentary freedom. The normative motiva-
tion behind this can be seen in a quote taken from a speech by Mirabeau in the Assem-
blée Nationale in 1791: 
I do not know, gentlemen, how it should be possible to reconcile the new French constitution, in 
which everything is traced back to the great and admirable principle of political equality, with 
a law that allows a father, a mother to forget these sacred principles of natural equality when it 
comes to their children, with a law that favors differences that are universally condemned, and 
thus further increases the disparities brought forth in society by differences in talent and indus-
try, instead of correcting them through the equal division of the domestic goods. (Mirabeau, 
April 2, 1791, in Mirabeau [1791] 2003: 24)
2 Entails
A second field in which the reform of inheritance law was meant to transform the so-
cial order on the basis of Enlightenment ideas was the abolition of entails. Entails were 
an important and highly controversial instrument for preserving the concentrated dis-
tribution of landownership of feudal societies by placing restrictions on heirs’ rights 
of disposition. If property is entailed, it cannot be sold; instead, it is passed on from 
generation to generation according to the succession determined by the founder. As a 
rule, the landed property was bequeathed to the eldest son and had to be passed on in 
all subsequent successions to the eldest son in the next generation. Entails are a legal 
institution of dynastic bequest through which the testator can control the use of his 
property across generations, thereby exerting influence on the property relationships 
of the succeeding generations. The wealth is directed by the “dead hand” of the person 
who established the entail.
Fierce criticism developed against entails as early as the eighteenth century. It was aimed 
at the special privileges granted to one class of property owners, as well as at the po-
litical structures propped up by these privileges. Preferential treatment of one social 
class in property law runs counter to the principle of civic equality, which serves as the 
normative foundation of the liberal concept of social order. Liberal social theory re-
jected entail as an instrument for the dynastic perpetuation of the nobility’s privileged 
social status. In the liberal worldview, entail goes against civic equality, individual rights 
of freedom, the concept of meritocracy, and political democratization. This criticism 
was combined with economic arguments concerning the negative economic effects of 
restrictions on the mobility of property. John Stuart Mill ([1848]1976), for instance, 
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denounced entails as an aristocratic institution which promoted an economic culture 
that ran counter to people’s acquisitive tendencies: the “heir of entail, being assured of 
succeeding to the family property, however undeserving of it, and being aware of this 
from his earliest years, has much more than the ordinary chance of growing up idle, dis-
sipated, and profligate” (Mill[1848]1976: 895).
Two quotes by contemporaries show how vital they considered the abolition of entails 
to be for the modernization of society. A report to the Assemblée Nationale from 1792 
reads: “(E)ntails are odious. … their preservation is incompatible with the sacred prin-
ciples of liberty and equality …” (Arch. Parl., First Series, Vol. 49, p. 55, quoted in Eckert 
1992: 183). In the United States, Thomas Jefferson formulated his rejection of entails 
succinctly: “The earth belongs in usufruct to the living” (Jefferson 1789). Even conser-
vative legal scholars – at least in the United States – were outspoken critics of this insti-
tution. James Kent, for instance, wrote in the early nineteenth century that entails have 
“no application to republican establishments, where wealth does not form a permanent 
distinction, and under which every individual of every family has his equal rights, and 
is equally invited, by the genius of the institutions, to depend upon his own merit and 
exertions” (Kent[1827]1971: 20). 
Hence, one of the crucial reforms in inheritance law in the nineteenth century was the 
abolition of entails, which occurred in the United States during the Revolution. The 
same holds true for France, with the exception, however, that entails were reintroduced 
in the period of restoration and finally abolished only during the Second Republic in 
1848. In Germany, abolition had to wait until the Revolution of 1919.
3 Estate taxation
Finally, the third field in which the new regulations on inheritance were meant to be an 
important element of social reform was estate taxation. The early nineteenth century 
saw the emergence of a debate among liberal and early socialist social reformers in 
which inheritance taxation was advocated as an important instrument for making good 
on the promise of equality and for solving the “social question.” Within the framework 
of liberal social theory, inheritance taxation appeared to be an especially suitable tool 
for achieving equality of opportunity within a system based on private property (Beck-
ert 1999). Since inheritance taxation falls upon property that passes to heirs without 
any effort of their own, taxing this wealth is in line with the meritocratic principle. In 
normative terms, inheritance taxation seems far less problematic than an income or 
consumption tax.
Four arguments served to justify the introduction of an inheritance tax:
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(1) Proponents of an inheritance tax referred directly to the principle of achievement. 
Many liberal thinkers argued that the “accidents of birth” have no normative place in a 
liberal social order. Social inequality could be justified only by the different individual 
contributions of members of society, not by the luck of being born into a wealthy fam-
ily. As a consequence, property needs to be redistributed by each new generation. In the 
1840s, the American social reformer Orestes Brownson, for instance, advocated confis-
catory inheritance taxes. They alone were compatible with the principle of equality of 
opportunity and individual entrepreneurship: 
A man shall have all he honestly acquires, as long as he himself belongs to the world in which 
he acquires it. But his power over his property must cease with his life, and his property must 
then become the property of the state, to be disposed of by some equitable law for the use of the 
generation which takes his place. (Brownson[1840]1978: 24)
Brownson’s intention was to endow individuals with equal resources at the start of life. 
To that end, ascriptive material privileges were to be abolished (ibid.: 60ff.). Property 
rights terminated upon death and property thus reverted to society (ibid.: 71). If prop-
erty became “free,” “one man can rightfully appropriate to himself no more than, in an 
equal division of the whole among all the members of the new generation, would be his 
share” (ibid.: 75). Brownson’s goal was to implement equal opportunity and with it an 
achievement-based distribution of social wealth. 
(2) The second argument in favor of estate taxation referred to changing family struc-
tures in the process of modernization. John Stuart Mill ([1848]1976), for instance, point-
ed to the change in the structure of property in bourgeois societies. In earlier societies, 
the family owned property. When a family member died there was no succession, be-
cause one share of the family wealth simply passed to the other members of the fam-
ily. Death and birth merely changed the identity of those who participated in property 
jointly owned by the clan. Modern society, however, was characterized by a fundamental 
change in family structures, according to Mill. That change made it meaningful to speak 
of individual property in the first place, but at the same time it delegitimized inheritance: 
“The unit of society is not now the family or clan, composed of all the reputed descen-
dants of a common ancestor, but the individual; or at most a pair of individuals with 
their unemancipated children” (Mill[1848]1976: 222).
(3) A third argument justifying inheritance taxes referred to the changing role of the state, 
which takes on more and more obligations and needs to secure the financial means to 
fulfill them. This was an argument that was advocated in particular by representatives of 
the historical school in Germany. In his Rede über die soziale Frage (Speech on the Social 
Question, 1872), Adolf Wagner advocated a progressive inheritance tax because, in the 
process of modernization, tasks of the family would increasingly shift to the state: 
The more individualism takes hold in the life of the people in place of the strict family and gen-
der order, the more justified in principle, and the more necessary and just in practice, does the 
participation of the public body, especially the state, in inheritance become, and therefore the 
more justified is a system of expansive inheritance taxes. (Wagner 1880: 477f.)
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(4) Finally, the fourth argument referred to the consequences of wealth concentration 
through inheritances for the democratic political order. This argument was especially 
prominent in the American debate in the early twentieth century. It reflects mistrust 
of “big business” and its role in the Gilded Age. The populist and progressive move-
ments in particular pointed to the threat to the democratic political process stemming 
from wealth concentration. President Franklin D. Roosevelt applied this argument, for 
instance, in a speech to Congress in 1935: “Such inherited economic power is as incon-
sistent with the ideals of this generation as inherited political power was inconsistent 
with the ideals of the generation which established our Government” (Roosevelt, Con-
gressional Record, No. 79, Vol. 9, p. 9712, June 19, 1935).
Progressive inheritance taxes were introduced in France in 1901, in Germany in 1906 
and in the United States in 1916. The conflict over the taxation of inheritance was the 
most important theme in inheritance law in the twentieth century. Inheritance taxa-
tion was a highly contested political issue. This came about also because the taxation of 
inheritances introduced a new regulatory quality compared to the questions of inheri-
tance law examined previously. Through inheritance taxes the state does not interfere 
with the distribution of property within the family, but appropriates for itself a part 
of the property left behind by the deceased. Questions of individual property rights, 
equality, justice, and the economic and familial consequences of the rules of inheritance 
law are related to the distribution of wealth within society. 
4 Inheritance law as social reform
The discussion of the three legal fields in which inheritance law has been most contro-
versial shows the extent to which this legal realm had been considered crucial for social 
reform. While most of the arguments were brought into the debate by the first half of 
the nineteenth century, the political controversy continued until about the 1930s. In 
the first part of the twentieth century, many of the reforms discussed in the nineteenth 
century were finally institutionalized. Entails were also abolished in Germany (1919), 
Great Britain ended primogeniture (1925), legal reforms in statutory law led to more 
gender equality, and almost all Western European countries and the United States in-
troduced progressive inheritance taxes. Hence we can observe how inheritance law, in 
accordance with the principles of achievement and equality of opportunity, represents 
an important pillar of modernity.
This is not to say that the reforms that were implemented did not meet fierce opposition. 
It took until 1919 for entails to be abolished in Germany. The introduction of progres-
sive inheritance taxes was met with furious opposition by conservatives, and in the 
United States the federal estate tax was almost abolished again in the 1920s. But despite 
this opposition there was an understanding that the regulation of the transfer of prop-
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erty from one generation to the next is an important topic with profound implications 
for the type of society we live in. The topic of inheritance law reform entered the politi-
cal discourse from various social fields: from social movements that emanated from the 
lower social classes and the middle class; from property owners themselves; and from 
scholarly discourse. While the reforms did not meet with universal approval, there was 
a climate of public opinion in which reform was perceived as necessary to enhance 
equality of opportunity, to counterbalance the existing concentration of wealth, and to 
promote tax equity. In the United States, a new understanding of the role of the state in 
social reform took hold in the late nineteenth century, one that would shape large parts 
of the history of Western countries in the twentieth century.
5 The backlash on inheritance law in the late twentieth century
Popular support for inheritance taxation can be observed in the United States, for in-
stance, in populist movements such as Senator Huey Long’s Share Our Wealth move-
ment in the 1930s. Long’s demand was to impose a confiscatory tax on fortunes over 
one million dollars (Fried 1999: 65ff.). By 1935, the Share Our Wealth movement had 
grown to 7 million members, all over the United States. However, this popular support 
for estate taxation was not sustained throughout the twentieth century. 
It is this change to which I now turn. To understand the change in the dominant per-
ception of bequeathed wealth in the last quarter of the twentieth century, we must ex-
amine two other populist movements in the United States. One is George McGovern’s 
unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1972. He called for a progressive inheritance tax, 
which would reach 100 percent for inheritances above half a million dollars (Weil 1973: 
74). McGovern assumed that the vast majority of voters had strong reservations about 
the existing concentration of wealth in American society and would therefore support 
his plan. But the political mood in the United States had changed by that time and 
the broad American middle class was now unwilling to support such demands. By the 
1990s, opposition to estate taxation had become even more influential. In the context 
of debates in the United States on abolishing the federal estate tax, the advocacy group 
“nodeathtax.com” lobbied for the abolition of the estate tax, exerting a strong political 
influence on public attitudes towards the tax. The vast majority of American voters sup-
ported the tax reforms of the Bush administration in 2001, which included the phasing 
out of the estate tax in 2010. 
The lack of support for McGovern’s plan in 1972 can be seen as a symbolic turning 
point in applying inheritance law and inheritance taxes as instruments of social reform. 
Since the early 1970s, a process of restoration in inheritance law can be observed against 
the backdrop of vanishing public support for using inheritance law as a reform instru-
ment and an increasing public ignorance about this issue.
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Estate taxes have been abolished or severely reduced in many OECD countries, start-1. 
ing in 1972 with New Zealand. Opinion polls regularly show that the tax finds very 
little support among the electorate, even among the majority of voters who would 
never be personally affected by this tax because they lack taxable assets. It is puzzling 
that this is the case. Is it because voters lack accurate information, as the American 
political scientist Larry Bartels (2005) argues in his analysis of the Bush tax reforms? 
Is it because the taxation of bequests is seen as an undue interference in family rela-
tions? Is it because many people dream of being an heir to a large fortune themselves 
one day? Is it because (small) countries seek advantages in international tax compe-
tition? 
The discussion of entails showed that Enlightenment reformers were especially sus-2. 
picious of forms of dynastic wealth transfer that tie up wealth according to the will of 
the testator over many generations or indefinitely. In common law, the rule against 
perpetuities prevents wealth from being locked for more than about 100 years. In 
recent years, this rule has been abolished or significantly modified by almost half the 
American states. It has also been abolished in Ireland (Röthel 2010: 75; Moshman 
2006). In other jurisdictions as well, wealthy testators seek increasingly to control 
the living through their “dead hand,” whether through trusts or by donating their 
wealth to foundations. What does this imply for the possibility of social mobility in 
a society? What does it mean for the living to have their lives partly controlled by de-
cisions taken by a preceding generation? What does it mean with regard to Thomas 
Jefferson’s dictum: “The Earth belongs in usufruct to the living”?
It is only in the field of statutory inheritance law that we can observe a continuation 3. 
of modernization processes that started in the early nineteenth century. Husbands 
and wives are treated equally by inheritance law today; the horizontal relationship 
between a husband and wife has been strengthened at the expense of the inheritance 
rights of the blood line; increasingly, homosexual couples enjoy the right to inherit 
from their partners; and children born out of wedlock have been granted the same 
inheritance rights as legitimate offspring. Many of these developments are very re-
cent. Some of them have not been completed. But, unlike the realms of estate taxa-
tion and control by the “dead hand,” these developments show no signs of reversal.
6 Conclusion
“Are we still modern?” It is, I believe, a helpful exercise to go back in history and try to 
understand the normative concerns of the time in which the foundations of our po-
litical and social orders were formed. This provides a yardstick against which current 
discourses and institutional changes can be measured. Inheritance has been seen as an 
important instrument of social and democratic reform. Indeed, it has been an instru-
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ment of social modernization. Concerns about equal opportunities, individual freedom, 
social justice, and the viability of the democratic order stood front and center in these 
debates. Today, interest in the topic has largely vanished and when the taxation of in-
heritances is debated, issues of efficient taxation dominate. This is but a small part of 
the issues involved in the regulation of transfers mortis causa. 
It is certainly not easy to explain this change. I believe it is part of the great transforma-
tion (Blyth 2002) that has taken place since the 1970s in all Western countries. Support 
for a strong state as an instrument of social reform has declined dramatically since the 
years of the postwar consensus. Taxation is seen as inhibiting economic growth within 
the context of the dominant supply-side economics. Globalization allows mobile capi-
tal to choose among legal jurisdictions on a global scale, providing incentives, especially 
to small states, to offer low taxation regimes to wealthy individuals. 
The change, however, is not just economic, but social and cultural as well. The increas-
ing social pressures on the middle class, combined with processes of individualization 
observed by sociologists since the 1960s, contribute to desolidarization. Attempting to 
protect one’s offspring from the vagaries of the market through inheritance is an indi-
vidualized reaction to social conditions which expose actors to more and more insecu-
rity. The taxation of inheritances is not perceived as a means of securing the provision 
of opportunities socially, but as a further threat. 
Culturally, there seems to be a tendency for the distribution of wealth to find legiti-
mation even if it is not based on achievement resulting from individual performance.
Instead, “success” – as the German sociologist Sighard Neckel (2008) argues – is the 
category according to which wealth and social status are allocated, whether it concerns 
the incomes of top managers that have increased to levels which bear no relationship 
to their work performance, the incomes celebrities derive from their popularity, the 
promise of riches from lotteries, or inheritances. Societies seem once again willing to 
allow prosperity to be disconnected from individual performance. If one is to believe 
sociological studies on attitudes towards inequality, it seems that structures that repro-
duce social inequality are much less a normative problem for the average person than 
they are for the social scientist (Sachweh 2010). 
“Are we still modern?” What it means to be modern must be constantly redefined. Judged 
by the normative standards defined in the era of the Enlightenment and informing 
political controversies through much of the nineteenth and twentieth century, social 
organization is undergoing profound change. Current developments in inheritance law 
and the public discourse about them are indicative of this shift in how societies set 
priorities.
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